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ABSTRACT
Online game playing algorithms produce high-quality strategies
with a fraction of memory and computation required by their of-
fline alternatives. Continual Resolving (CR) is a recent theoreti-
cally sound approach to online game playing that has been used
to outperform human professionals in poker. However, parts of
the algorithm were specific to poker, which enjoys many proper-
ties not shared by other imperfect information games. We present
a domain-independent formulation of CR applicable to any two-
player zero-sum extensive-form games (EFGs). It works with an
abstract resolving algorithm, which can be instantiated by various
EFG solvers. We further describe and implement its Monte Carlo
variant (MCCR) which uses Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret
Minimization (MCCFR) as a resolver. We prove the correctness of
CR and show an O(T−1/2)-dependence of MCCR’s exploitability
on the computation time. Furthermore, we present an empirical
comparison of MCCR with incremental tree building to Online
Outcome Sampling and Information-set MCTS on several domains.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Strategies for playing games can be pre-computed offline for all
possible situations, or computed online only for the situations that
occur in a particular match. The advantage of the offline computa-
tion are stronger bounds on the quality of the computed strategy.
Therefore, it is preferable if we want to solve a game optimally. On
the other hand, online algorithms can produce strong strategies
with a fraction of memory and time requirements of the offline
approaches. Online game playing algorithms have outperformed
humans in Chess [14], Go [27], and no-limit Poker [3, 22].
Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2019), N. Agmon, M. E. Taylor, E. Elkind, M. Veloso (eds.), May 13–17, 2019,
Montreal, Canada. © 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
While online approaches have always been the method of choice
for strong play in perfect information games, it is less clear how
to apply them in imperfect information games (IIGs). To find the
optimal strategy for a specific situation in an IIG, a player has to
reason about the unknown parts of the game state. They depend
on the (possibly unobservable) actions of the opponent prior to the
situation, which in turn depends on what the optimal decisions
are for both players in many other parts of the game. This makes
the optimal strategies in distinct parts of the game closely interde-
pendent and makes correct reasoning about the current situation
difficult without solving the game as a whole.
Existing online game playing algorithms for imperfect informa-
tion games either do not provide any guarantees on the quality of
the strategy they produce [8, 9, 21], or require the existence of a
compact heuristic evaluation function and a significant amount of
computation to construct it [4, 22]. Moreover, the algorithms that
are theoretically sound were developed primarily for Texas hold’em
poker, which has a very particular information structure. After the
initial cards are dealt, all of the actions and chance outcomes that
follow are perfectly observable. Furthermore, since the players’
moves alternate, the number of actions taken by each player is
always known. None of this holds in general for games that can be
represented as two-player zero-sum extensive-form games (EFGs).
In a blind chess [8], we may learn we have lost a piece, but not nec-
essarily which of the opponent’s pieces took it. In visibility-based
pursuit-evasion [25], we may know the opponent remained hidden,
but not in which direction she moved. In phantom games [28], we
may learn it is our turn to play, but not how many illegal moves
has the opponent attempted. Because of these complications, the
previous theoretically sound algorithms for imperfect-information
games are no longer directly applicable.
The sole exception is Online Outcome Sampling (OOS) [20]. It is
theoretically sound, completely domain independent, and it does
not use any pre-computed evaluation function. However, it starts
all its samples from the beginning of the game, and it has to keep
sampling actions that cannot occur in the match anymore. As a
result, its memory requirements grow as more and more actions
are taken in the match, and the high variance in its importance
sampling corrections slows down the convergence.
We revisit the Continual Resolving algorithm (CR) introduced
in [22] for poker and show how it can be generalized in a way
that can handle the complications of general two-player zero-sum
EFGs. Based on this generic algorithm, we introduce Monte Carlo
Continual Resolving (MCCR), which combines MCCFR [18] with
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incremental construction of the game tree, similarly to OOS, but
replaces its targeted sampling scheme by Continual Resolving. This
leads to faster sampling since MCCR starts its samples not from the
root, but from the current point in the game. It also decreases the
memory requirements by not having to maintain statistics about
parts of the game no longer relevant to the current match. Further-
more, it allows evaluating continual resolving in various domains,
without the need to construct expensive evaluation functions.
We prove that MCCR’s exploitability approaches zero with in-
creasing computational resources and verify this property empiri-
cally in multiple domains. We present an extensive experimental
comparison of MCCR with OOS, Information-set Monte Carlo Tree
Search (IS-MCTS) [9] and MCCFR. We show that MCCR’s per-
formance heavily depends on its ability to quickly estimate key
statistics close to the root, which is good in some domains, but
insufficient in others.
2 BACKGROUND
We now describe the standard notation for IIGs and MCCFR.
2.1 Imperfect Information Games
We focus on two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with im-
perfect information. Based on [24], game G can be described by
• H – the set of histories, representing sequences of actions.
• Z – the set of terminal histories (those z ∈ H which are not
a prefix of any other history). We use д ⊏ h to denote the
fact that д is equal to or a prefix of h.
• A(h) := {a | ha ∈ H} denotes the set of actions available at
a non-terminal history h ∈ H \ Z. The term ha refers to a
history, i.e. child of history h by playing a.
• P : H \ Z → {1, 2, c} is the player function partitioning
non-terminal histories into H1, H2 and Hc depending on
which player chooses an action at h. Player c is a special
player, called “chance” or “nature”.
• The strategy of chance is a fixed probability distribution σc
over actions in chance player’s histories.
• The utility function u = (u1,u2) assigns to each terminal
history z the rewards u1(z),u2(z) ∈ R received by players 1
and 2 upon reaching z. We assume that u2 = −u1.
• The information-partitionI = (I1,I2) captures the imperfect
information of G . For each player i ∈ {1, 2}, Ii is a partition
ofHi . If д,h ∈ Hi belong to the same I ∈ Ii then i cannot
distinguish between them. Actions available at infoset I are
the same as in each history h of I , therefore we overload
A(I ) := A(h). We only consider games with perfect recall,
where the players always remember their past actions and
the information sets visited so far.
A behavioral strategy σi ∈ Σi of player i assigns to each I ∈ Ii
a probability distribution σ (I ) over available actions a ∈ A(I ). A
strategy profile (or simply strategy) σ = (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 consists
of strategies of players 1 and 2. For a player i ∈ {1, 2}, −i will be
used to denote the other two actors {1, 2, c} \ {i} inG (for example
H−1 := H2 ∪Hc ) and oppi denotes i’s opponent (opp1 := 2).
2.2 Nash Equilibria and Counterfactual Values
The reach probability of a history h ∈ H under σ is defined as
πσ (h) = πσ1 (h)πσ2 (h)πσc (h), where each πσi (h) is a product of prob-
abilities of the actions taken by player i between the root and h.
The reach probabilities πσi (h |д) and πσ (h |д) conditional on be-
ing in some д ⊏ h are defined analogously, except that the prod-
ucts are only taken over the actions on the path between д and
h. Finally, πσ−i (·) is defined like πσ (·), except that in the product
πσ1 (·)πσ2 (·)πσc (·) the term πσi (·) is replaced by 1.
The expected utility for player i of a strategy profile σ is ui (σ ) =∑
z∈Z πσ (z)ui (z). The profile σ is an ϵ-Nash equilibrium (ϵ-NE) if
(∀i ∈ {1, 2}) : ui (σ ) ≥ max
σ ′i ∈Σi
ui (σ ′i ,σoppi ) − ϵ .
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is an ϵ-NE with ϵ = 0. It is a standard
result that in two-player zero-sum games, all σ ∗ ∈ NE have the
same ui (σ ∗) [24]. The exploitability expl(σ ) of σ ∈ Σ is the average
of exploitabilities expli (σ ), i ∈ {1, 2}, where
expli (σ ) := ui (σ ∗) − minσ ′oppi ∈Σoppi
ui (σi ,σ ′oppi ).
The expected utility conditional on reaching h ∈ H is
uσi (h) =
∑
h⊏z∈Z
πσ (z |h)ui (z).
An ingenious variant of this concept is the counterfactual value
(CFV) of a history, defined as vσi (h) := πσ−i (h)uσi (h), and the coun-
terfactual value of taking an action a at h, defined as vσi (h,a) :=
πσ−i (h)uσi (ha). We set vσi (I ) :=
∑
h∈I vσi (h) for I ∈ Ii and define
vσi (I ,a) analogously. A strategy σ⋆2 ∈ Σ2 is a counterfactual best re-
sponseCBR(σ1) toσ1 ∈ Σ1 ifv(σ1,σ
⋆
2 )
2 (I ) = maxa∈A(I )v
(σ1,σ⋆2 )
2 (I ,a)
holds for each I ∈ I2 [7].
2.3 Monte Carlo CFR
For a strategy σ ∈ Σ, I ∈ Ii and a ∈ A(I ), we set the counterfactual
regret for not playing a in I under strategy σ to
rσi (I ,a) := vσi (I ,a) −vσi (I ). (1)
The Counterfactual Regret minimization (CFR) algorithm [29] gen-
erates a consecutive sequence of strategies σ 0,σ 1, . . . , σT in such
a way that the immediate counterfactual regret
R¯ti, imm(I ) := maxa∈A(I ) R¯
t
i, imm(I ,a) := maxa∈A(I )
1
t
t∑
t ′=1
rσ
t ′
i (I ,a)
is minimized for each I ∈ Ii , i ∈ {1, 2}. It does this by using the
Regret Matching update rule [1, 12]:
σ t+1(I ,a) :=
max{R¯ti, imm(I ,a), 0}∑
a′∈A(I ) max{R¯ti, imm(I ,a′), 0}
. (2)
Since the overall regret is bounded by the sum of immediate coun-
terfactual regrets [29, Theorem 3], this causes the average strategy
σ¯T (defined by (3)) to converge to a NE [18, Theorem 1]:
σ¯T (I ,a) :=
∑T
t=1 π
σ t
i (I )σ t (I ,a)∑T
t=1 π
σ t
i (I )
(where I ∈ Ii ). (3)
In other words, by accumulating immediate cf. regrets at each
information set from the strategies σ 0, . . . ,σ t , we can produce new
strategy σ t+1. However only the average strategy is guaranteed
to converge to NE with O(1/√T ) – the individual regret matching
strategies can oscillate. The initial strategy σ 0 is uniform, but in
fact any strategy will work. If the sum in the denominator of update
rule (2) is zero, σ t+1(I ,a) is set to be also uniform.
The disadvantage of CFR is the costly need to traverse the whole
game tree during each iteration. Monte Carlo CFR [18] works sim-
ilarly, but only samples a small portion of the game tree each it-
eration. It calculates sampled variants of CFR’s variables, each of
which is an unbiased estimate of the original [18, Lemma 1]. We use
a particular variant of MCCFR called Outcome Sampling (OS) [18].
OS only samples a single terminal history z at each iteration, using
the sampling strategy σ t,ϵ := (1 − ϵ)σ t + ϵ · rnd, where ϵ ∈ (0, 1]
controls the exploration and rnd(I ,a) := 1|A(I ) | .
This z is then traversed forward (to compute each player’s prob-
ability πσ ti (h) of playing to reach each prefix of z) and backward
(to compute each player’s probability πσ ti (z |h) of playing the re-
maining actions of the history). During the backward traversal, the
sampled counterfactual regrets at each visited I ∈ I are computed
according to (4) and added to R˜Ti, imm(I ):
r˜σ
t
i (I ,a) :=
{
wI · (πσ t (z |ha) − πσ t (z |h)) if ha ⊏ z
wI · (0 − πσ t (z |h)) otherwise
, (4)
where h denotes the prefix of z which is in I and wI stands for
1
π σ t,ϵ (z)π
σ t
−i (z |h)ui (z) [17].
3 DOMAIN-INDEPENDENT FORMULATION
OF CONTINUAL RESOLVING
The only domain for which continual resolving has been previously
defined and implemented is poker. Poker has several special prop-
erties: a) all information sets have a fixed number of histories of
the same length, b) public states have the same size and c) only a
single player is active in any public state.
There are several complications that occur in more general EFGs:
(1) We might be asked to take several turns within a single public
state, for example in phantom games. (2) When we are not the
acting player, we might be unsure whether it is the opponent’s
or chance’s turn. (3) Finally, both players might be acting within
the same public state, for example a secret chance roll determines
whether we get to act or not.
In this section, we present an abstract formulation of continual
resolving robust enough to handle the complexities of general EFGs.
However, we first need to define the concepts like public tree and
resolving gadget more carefully.
3.1 Subgames and the Public Tree
To speak about the information available to player i in histories
where he doesn’t act, we use augmented information sets. For player
i ∈ {1, 2} and history h ∈ H \Z, the i’s observation history ®Oi (h) in
h is the sequence (I1,a1, I2,a2, . . . ) of the information sets visited
and actions taken by i on the path to h (incl. I ∋ h if h ∈ Hi ). Two
histories д,h ∈ H \ Z belong to the same augmented information
set I ∈ Iaugi if ®Oi (д) = ®Oi (h). This is equivalent to the definition
from [7], except that our definition makes it clear that Iaugi is also
defined onHi (and coincides there withIi because of perfect recall).
Remark 3.1 (Alternatives to Iaug). Iaug isn’t the only viable
way of generalizing information sets. One could alternatively consider
some further-unrefineable perfect-recall partition I∗i of H which
coincides with Ii onHi , and many other variants between the two
extremes. We focus only on Iaug, since an in-depth discussion of the
general topic would be outside of the scope of this paper.
We use ∼ to denote histories indistinguishable by some player:
д∼h ⇐⇒ ®O1(д) = ®O1(h) ∨ ®O2(д) = ®O2(h).
By ≈ we denote the transitive closure of ∼. Formally, д ≈ h iff
(∃n) (∃h1, . . . ,hn ) : д∼h1, h1∼h2, . . . , hn−1∼hn , hn ∼h.
If two states do not satisfy д ≈ h, then it is common knowledge
that both players can tell them apart.
Definition 3.2 (Public state). Public partition is any partition S of
H \Z whose elements are closed under ∼ and form a tree. An ele-
ment S of such S is called a public state. The common knowledge
partition Sck is the one consisting of the equivalence classes of ≈.
Our definition of S is a reformulation of the definition of [15] in
terms of augmented information sets (which aren’t used in [15]).
The definition of Sck is novel. We endow any S with the tree
structure inherited fromH . Clearly,Sck is the finest public partition.
The concept of a public state is helpful for introducing imperfect-
information subgames (which aren’t defined in [15]).
Definition 3.3 (Subgame). A subgame rooted at a public state S is
the set G(S) := {h ∈ H | ∃д ∈ S : д ⊏ h}.
For comparison, [7] defines a subgame as “a forest of trees, closed
under both the descendant relation and membership within Iaugi
for any player”. For any h ∈ S ∈ Sck, the subgame rooted at S is the
smallest [7]-subgame containing h. As a result, [7]-subgames are
“forests of subgames rooted at common-knowledge public states”.
We can see that finer public partitions lead to smaller subgames,
which are easier to solve. In this sense, the common-knowledge
partition is the “best one”. However, finding Sck is sometimes non-
trivial, which makes the definition of general public states from [15]
important. The drawback of this definition is its ambiguity — indeed,
it allows for extremes such as grouping the wholeH into a single
public state, without giving a practical recipe for arriving at the
“intuitively correct” public partition.
3.2 Aggregation and the Upper Frontier
Often, it is useful to aggregate reach probabilities and counterfactual
values over (augmented) information sets or public states. In general
EFGs, an augmented information set I ∈ Iaugi can be “thick”, i.e. it
can contain both some ha ∈ H and it’s parent h. This necessarily
happens when we are unsure how many actions were taken by
other players between our two successive actions. For such I , we
only aggregate over the “upper frontier” Iˆ := {h ∈ I | ∄д ∈ I : д ⊏
h &д , h} of I [10, 11]: We overload πσ (·) as πσ (I ) := ∑h∈Iˆ πσ (h)
and vσi (·) as vσi (I ) :=
∑
h∈Iˆ v
σ
i (h). We define Sˆ for S ∈ S, πσi (I ),
πσ−i (I ) and vσi (I ,a) analogously. By Sˆ(i) := {I ∈ I
aug
i | Iˆ ⊆ Sˆ} we
denote the topmost (augmented) information sets of player i in S .
Figure 1: Resolving game G˜ (S,σ , v˜) constructed for player △
in a public state S . Player’s (augmented) information sets are
drawn with solid (resp. dashed) lines of the respective color.
The chance node ⃝ chooses one of ▽’s histories h˜1, h˜2, h˜3,
which correspond to the “upper frontier” of S .
To the best of our knowledge, the issue of “thick” information
sets has only been discussed in the context of non-augmented
information sets in games with imperfect recall [11]. One scenario
where thick augmented information sets cause problems is the
resolving gadget game, which we discuss next.
3.3 Resolving Gadget Game
We describe a generalization of the resolving gadget game from [7]
(cf. [3, 23]) for resolving Player 1’s strategy (see Figure 1).
Let S ∈ S be a public state to resolve from, σ ∈ Σ, and let
v˜(I ) ∈ R for I ∈ Sˆ(i) be the required counterfactual values. First,
the upper frontier of S is duplicated as {h˜ | h ∈ Sˆ} =: S˜ . Player 2
is the acting player in S˜ , and from his point of view, nodes h˜ are
partitioned according to {I˜ := {h˜ | h ∈ Iˆ } | I ∈ Sˆ(2)}. In h˜ ∈ I˜
corresponding to h ∈ I , he can choose between “following” (F)
into h and “terminating” (T), which ends the game with utility
u˜2(h˜T ) := v˜(I )πσ−2(S)/πσ−2(I ). From any h ∈ Sˆ onward, the game
is identical to G(S), except that the utilities are multiplied by a
constant: u˜i (z) := ui (z)πσ−2(S). To turn this into a well-defined
game, a root chance node is added and connected to each h ∈ Sˆ ,
with transition probabilities πσ−2(h)/πσ−2(S).
This game is called the resolving gadget game G˜ (S,σ , v˜), or
simply G˜ (S) when there is no risk of confusion, and the vari-
ables related to it are denoted by tilde. If ρ˜ ∈ Σ˜ is a “resolved”
strategy in G˜(S), we denote the new combined strategy in G as
σnew := σ |G(S )←ρ˜ , i.e. play according to strategy ρ˜ in the subgame
G(S) and according to σ everywhere else.
The difference between G˜ (S,σ , v˜) and the original version of [7]
is that ourmodification only duplicates the upper frontier Sˆ and uses
normalization constant
∑
Sˆ π
σ
−2(h) (rather than
∑
S π
σ
−2(h)) and esti-
mates v˜(I ) = ∑Iˆ v˜(h) (rather than∑I v˜(h)). This enables G˜ (S,σ , v˜)
to handle domains with thick information sets and public states.
While tedious, it is straightforward to check that G˜ (S,σ , v˜) has all
the properties proved in [6, 7, 22]. Without our modification, the
Input : Information set I ∈ I1
Output :An action a ∈ A(I )
1 S← the public state which contains I ;
2 if S < KPS then
3 G˜(S) ← BuildResolvingGame(S,D(S));
4 KPS← KPS ∪ S;
5 NPS← all S ′ ∈ S where CR acts for the first time after
leaving KPS;
6 ρ˜, D˜← Resolve(G˜(S),NPS);
7 σ1 |S ′ ← ρ˜ |S ′ ;
8 D← calculate data for NPS based on D, σ1 and D˜;
9 end
10 return a ∼ σ1(I )
Algorithm 1: Function Play of Continual Resolving
resolving games would either sometimes be ill-defined, or wouldn’t
have the desired properties.
The following properties are helpful to get an intuitive under-
standing of gadget games. Their more general versions and proofs
(resp. references for proofs) are listed in the appendix.
Lemma 3.4 (Gadget game preserves opponent’s values). For
each I ∈ Iaug2 with I ⊂ G(S), we have vσ
new
2 (I ) = v˜
ρ˜
2 (I ).
Note that the conclusion does not hold for counterfactual values
of the (resolving) player 1! (This can be easily verified on a simple
specific example such as Matching Pennies.)
Lemma 3.5 (Optimal resolving). If σ and ρ˜ are both Nash equi-
libria and v˜(I ) = vσ2 (I ) for each I ∈ Sˆ(2), then σnew1 is not exploitable.
3.4 Continual Resolving
Domain-independent continual resolving closely follows the struc-
ture of continual resolving for poker [22], but uses a generalized
resolving gadget and handles situations which do not arise in poker,
such as multiple moves in one public state. We explain it from the
perspective of Player 1. The abstract CR keeps track of strategy σ1
it has computed in previous moves. Whenever it gets to a public
state S , where σ1 has not been computed, it resolves the subgame
G(S). As a by-product of this resolving, it estimates opponent’s
counterfactual values vσ1,CBR(σ1)2 for all public states that might
come next, allowing it to keep resolving as the game progresses.
CR repetitively calls a Play function which takes the current
information set I ∈ I1 as the input and returns an action a ∈ A(I )
for Player 1 to play. It maintains the following variables:
• S ∈ S . . . the current public state,
• KPS ⊂ S . . . the public states where strategy is known,
• σ1 . . . a strategy defined for every I ∈ I1 in KPS,
• NPS ⊂ S . . . the public states where CR may resolve next,
• D(S ′) for S ′ ∈ NPS . . . data allowing resolving at S ′, such as
the estimates of opponent’s counterfactual values.
The pseudo-code for CR is described inAlgorithm 1. If the current
public state belongs to KPS, then the strategy σ1(I ) is defined, and
we sample action a from it. Otherwise, we should have the data
necessary to build some resolving game G˜(S) (line 3). We then
determine the public states NPS where we might need to resolve
next (line 5). We solve G˜(S) via some resolving method which also
computes the data necessary to resolve from any S ′ ∈ NPS (line
6). Finally, we save the resolved strategy in S and update the data
needed for resolving (line 7-9). To initialize the variables before the
first resolving, we set KPS and σ1 to ∅, find appropriate NPS, and
start solving the game from the root using the same solver as Play,
i.e. _ ,D ← Resolve(G,NPS).
We now consider CR variants that use the gadget game from Sec-
tion 3.3 and data of the form D = (r1, v˜), where r1(S ′) = (πσ11 (h))S ′
is CR’s range and v˜(S ′) = (v˜(J ))J estimates opponent’s counterfac-
tual value at each J ∈ S ′(2). We shall use the following notation:
Sn is the n-th public state from which CR resolves; ρ˜n is the corre-
sponding strategy in G˜(Sn ); σn1 is CR’s strategy after n-th resolving,
defined on KPSn ; the optimal extension of σn1 is
σ ∗n1 := argminν1∈Σ1 expl1
(
σn1 |KPSn ∪ ν1 |S\KPSn
)
.
Lemmata 24 and 25 of [22] (summarized into Lemma A.5 in our
Appendix A) give the following generalization of [22, Theorem S1]:
Theorem 3.6 (Continual resolving bound). Suppose that CR
uses D = (r1, v˜) and G˜(S,σ1, v˜). Then the exploitability of its strat-
egy is bounded by expl1(σ1) ≤ ϵv˜0 + ϵR1 + ϵv˜1 + · · · + ϵv˜N−1 + ϵRN ,
where N is the number of resolving steps and ϵRn := e˜xpl1(ρ˜n ), ϵv˜n :=∑
J ∈Sˆn+1(2)
v˜(J ) −vσ ∗n1 ,CBR2 (J ) are the exploitability (in G˜(Sn )) and
value estimation error made by the n-th resolver (resp. initialization
for n = 0).
The DeepStack algorithm from [22] is a poker-specific instance
of the CR variant described in the above paragraph. Its resolver is
a modification of CFR with neural network heuristics and sparse
look-ahead trees. We make CR domain-independent and allowing
for different resolving games (BuildResolvingGame), algorithms
(Resolve), and schemes (by changing line 5).
4 MONTE CARLO CONTINUAL RESOLVING
Monte Carlo Continual Resolving is a specific instance of CR which
uses Outcome Sampling MCCFR for game (re)solving. Its data are
of the form D = (r1, v˜) described above and it resolves using the
gadget game from Section 3.3. We first present an abstract version
of the algorithms that we formally analyze, and then add improve-
ments that make it practical. To simplify the theoretical analysis,
we assume MCCFR computes the exact counterfactual value of
resulting average strategy σ¯T for further resolving. (We later dis-
cuss more realistic alternatives.) The following theorem shows that
MCCR’s exploitability converges to 0 at the rate of O(T−1/2).
Theorem 4.1 (MCCR bound). With probability at least (1−p)N+1,
the exploitability of strategy σ computed by MCCR satisfies
expli (σ ) ≤
(√
2/√p + 1
)
|Ii |∆u,i
√
Ai
δ
(
2√
T0
+
2N − 1√
TR
)
,
where T0 and TR are the numbers of MCCR’s iterations in pre-play
and each resolving, N is the required number of resolvings, δ =
minz,t qt (z) where qt (z) is the probability of sampling z ∈ Z at
iteration t , ∆u,i = maxz,z′ |ui (z) −ui (z′)| andAi = maxI ∈Ii |A(I )|.
The proof is presented in the appendix. Essentially, it inductively
combines the OS bound (Lemma A.1) with the guarantees available
for resolving games in order to compute the overall exploitability
bound.1 For specific domains, a much tighter bound can be obtained
by going through our proof in more detail and noting that the size of
subgames decreases exponentially as the game progresses (whereas
the proof assumes that it remains constant). In effect, this would
replace the N in the bound above by a small constant.
4.1 Practical Modifications
Above, we describe an abstract version of MCCR optimized for
clarity and ease of subsequent theoretical analysis. We now describe
the version of MCCR that we implemented in practice. The code
used for the experiments is available online at https://github.com/
aicenter/gtlibrary-java/tree/mccr.
4.1.1 Incremental Tree-Building. A massive reduction in the
memory requirements can be achieved by building the game tree
incrementally, similarly to Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) [5]. We
start with a tree that only contains the root. When an information
set is reached that is not in memory, it is added to it and a playout
policy (e.g., uniformly random) is used for the remainder of the
sample. In playout, information sets are not added to memory. Only
the regrets in information sets stored in the memory are updated.
4.1.2 Counterfactual Value Estimation. Since the computation
of the exact counterfactual values of the average strategy needed
by G˜(S,σ , ·) requires the traversal of the whole game tree, we have
to work with their estimates instead. To this end, our MCCFR
additionally computes the opponent’s sampled counterfactual values
v˜σ
t
2 (I ) :=
1
πσ
t,ϵ (z)π
σ t
−2 (h)πσ
t(z |h)u2(z).
It is not possible to compute the exact counterfactual value of the
average strategy just from the values of the current strategies. Once
the T iterations are complete, the standard way of estimating the
counterfactual values of σ¯T is using arithmetic averages
v˜(I ) := 1
T
∑
v˜σ
t
2 (I ). (5)
However, we have observed better results with weighted averages
v˜(h) :=
∑
t
π˜σ
t(h)vσ t2 (h) /
∑
t
π˜σ
t(h). (6)
The stability and accuracy of these estimates is experimentally
evaluated in Section 5 and further analyzed in Appendix B. We also
propose an unbiased estimate of the exact values computed from
the already executed samples, but its variance makes it impractical.
4.1.3 Root Distribution of Gadgets. As in [22], we use the infor-
mation about opponent’s strategy from previous resolving when
constructing the gadget game. Rather than being proportional to
π−2(h), the root probabilities are proportional to π−2(h)(π2(h) + ϵ).
This modification is sound as long as ϵ > 0.
1Note that Theorem 4.1 isn’t a straightforward corollary of Theorem 3.6, since calcu-
lating the numbers ϵ v˜n does require non-trivial work. In particular, σ¯T from the n-th
resolving isn’t the same as σn∗1 , CBR(σn∗1 ) and the simplifying assumption about v˜
is not equivalent to assuming that ϵ v˜n = 0.
4.1.4 Custom Sampling Scheme. To improve the efficiency of
resolving by MCCFR, we use a custom sampling scheme which
differs from OS in two aspects. First, we modify the above sampling
scheme such that with probability 90% we sample a history that
belongs to the current information set I . This allows us to focus
on the most relevant part of the game. Second, whenever h˜ ∈
S˜ is visited by MCCFR, we sample both actions (T and F). This
increases the transparency of the algorithm, since all iterations
now “do a similar amount of work” (rather than some terminating
immediately). These modifications are theoretically sound, since
the resulting sampling scheme still satisfies the assumptions of the
general MCCFR bound from [17].
4.1.5 Keeping the Data between Successive Resolvings. Both in
pre-play and subsequent resolvings, MCCFR operates on succes-
sively smaller and smaller subsets of the game tree. In particular, we
don’t need to start each resolving from scratch, but we can re-use
the previous computations. To do this, we initialize each resolv-
ing MCCFR with the MCCFR variables (regrets, average strategy
and the corresponding value estimates) from the previous resolv-
ing (resp. pre-play). In practice this is accomplished by simply
not resetting the data from the previous MCCFR. While not being
backed up by theory, this approach worked better in most practical
scenarios, and we believe it can be made correct with the use of
warm-starting [2] of the resolving gadget.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
After brief introduction of competing methods and explaining the
used methodology, we focus on evaluating the alternative methods
to estimate the counterfactual values required for resolving during
MCCFR. Next, we evaluate how quickly and reliably these values
can be estimated in different domains, since these values are crucial
for good performance of MCCR. Finally, we compare exploitability
and head-to-head performance to competing methods.
5.1 Competing Methods
Information-Set Monte Carlo Tree Search. IS-MCTS [19] runs
MCTS samples as in a perfect information game, but computes
statistics for the whole information set and not individual states.
When initiated from a non-empty match history, it starts samples
uniformly from the states in the current information set. We use
two selection functions: Upper Confidence bound applied to Trees
(UCT) [16] and Regret Matching (RM) [13].We use the same settings
as in [20]: UCT constant 2x the maximal game outcome, and RM
with exploration 0.2. In the following, we refer to IS-MCTS with
the corresponding selection function by only UCT or RM.
Online Outcome Sampling. OOS [20] is an online search variant
of MCCFR. MCCFR samples from the root of the tree and needs to
pre-build the whole game tree. OOS has two primary distinctions
from MCCFR: it builds its search tree incrementally and it can bias
samples with some probability to any specific parts of the game
tree. This is used to target the information sets (OOS-IST) or the
public states (OOS-PST) where the players act during a match.
We do not run OOS-PST on domain of IIGS, due to non-trivial
biasing of sampling towards current public state.
We further compare to MCCFR with incremental tree building
and the random player denoted RND.
5.2 Computing Exploitability
Since the online game playing algorithms do not compute the strat-
egy for the whole game, evaluating exploitability of the strategies
they play is more complicated. One approach, called brute-force
in [20], suggest ensuring that the online algorithm is executed in
each information set in the game and combining the computed
strategies. If the thinking time of the algorithm per move is t , it
requiresO(tÛ|I|) time to compute one combined strategy and multi-
ple runs are required to achieve statistical significance for random-
ized algorithms. While this is prohibitively expensive even for the
smaller games used in our evaluation, computing the strategy for
each public state, instead of each information set is already feasible.
We use this approach, however, it means we have to disable the
additional targeting of the current information set in the resolving
gadget proposed in Section 4.1.4.
There are two options how to deal with the variance in the
combined strategies in different runs of the algorithm in order
to compute the exploitability of the real strategy realized by the
algorithm. The pessimistic option is to compute the exploitability of
each combined strategy and average the results. This assumes the
opponent knows the random numbers used by the algorithm for
sampling in each resolving. A more realistic option is to average the
combined strategies from different runs into an expected strategy ¯¯σ
and compute its exploitability. We use the latter.
5.3 Domains
For direct comparison with prior work, we use same domains
as in [20] with parametrizations noted in parentheses: Imperfect In-
formationGoofspiel IIGS(N), Liar’s Dice LD(D1,D2,F) andGeneric
Poker GP(T,C,R,B). We add Phantom Tic-Tac-Toe PTTT to also
have a domain with thick public states, and use Biased Rock Paper
Scissors B-RPS for small experiments. The detailed rules are in Ap-
pendix C with the sizes of the domains in Table 2. We use small
and large variants of the domains based on their parametrization.
Note that large variants are about 104 up to 1015 times larger than
the smaller ones.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Averaging of Sampled CFVs. Asmentioned in Section 4.1.2,
computing the exact counterfactual values of the average strategy
σ¯T is often prohibitive, and we replace it by using the arithmetic
or weighted averages instead. To compare the two approaches,
we run MCCFR on the B-RPS domain (which only has a single
NE σ∗ to which σ¯T converges) and measure the distance ∆v(t)
between the estimates and the correct action-values vσ ∗1 (root,a).
In Figure 2 (left), the weighted averages converge to the correct
values with increasing number of samples, while the arithmetic
averages eventually start diverging. The weighted averages are
more accurate (see Appendix, Figure 4 for comparison on each
domain) and we will use them exclusively in following experiments.
5.4.2 Stability of CFVs. To find a nearly optimal strategy when
resolving, MCCR first needs CFVs of such a strategy (Lemma A.5).
However, the MCCFR resolver typically won’t have enough time to
find such σ¯T . If MCCR is to work, the CFVs computed by MCCFR
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Figure 3: A comparison of exploitability (top) with “CFV in-
stability” (bottom) in different domains. For t = 107, the dif-
ferences are 0 by definition.
need to be close to those of an approximate equilibrium CFVs even
though they correspond to an exploitable strategy.
We run MCCFR in the root and focus on CFVs in the public
states where player 1 acts for the 2nd time (the gadget isn’t needed
for the first action, and thus neither are CFVs):
Ω := {J ∈ Iaug2 | ∃S ′ ∈ S,h ∈ S ′ : J ⊂ S ′& pl. 1 played once in h}.
Since there are multiple equilibria MCCFR might converge to, we
cannot measure the convergence exactly. Instead, we measure the
“instability” of CFV estimates by saving v˜t2(J ) for t ≤ T , tracking
how ∆t (J ) := |v˜t2(J ) − v˜T2 (J )| changes over time, and aggregating
it into 1|Ω |
∑
J ∆t (J ). We repeat this experiment with 100 different
MCCFR seeds and measure the expectation of the aggregates and,
for the small domains, the expected exploitability of σ¯ t . If the
resulting “instability” is close to zero after 105 samples (our typical
time budget), we consider CFVs to be sufficiently stable.
Figure 3 confirms that in small domains (LD, GP), CFVs stabilize
long before the exploitability of the strategy gets low. The error
still decreases in larger games (GS, PTTT), but at a slow rate.
5.4.3 Comparison of Exploitability with Other Algorithms. We
compare the exploitability of MCCR to OOS-PST and MCCFR, and
include random player for reference. We do not include OOS-IST,
whose exploitability is comparable to that of OOS-PST [20]. For an
evaluation of IS-MCTS’s exploitability (which is very high, with
the exception of poker) we refer the reader to [19, 20].
Figure 2 (right) confirms that for all algorithms, the exploitability
decreases with the increased time per move. MCCR is better than
MCCFR on LD and worse on IIGS. The keep variant of MCCR is
initially less exploitable than the reset variant, but improves slower.
This suggests the keep variant could be improved.
5.4.4 Influence of the Exploration Rate. One of MCCR’s parame-
ters is the exploration rate ϵ of itsMCCFR resolver.Whenmeasuring
the exploitability of MCCR we observed no noteworthy influence
of ϵ (for ϵ = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, across all of the evaluated domains).
5.4.5 Head-to-head Performance. For each pair of algorithms,
thousands of matches have been played on each domain, alternating
positions of player 1 and 2. In the smaller (larger) domains, play-
ers have 0.3s (5s) of pre-play computation and 0.1s (1s) per move.
Table 1 summarizes the results as percentages of the maximum
domain payoff.
Note that the results of the matches are not necessarily transitive,
since they are not representative of the algorithms’ exploitability.
When computationally tractable, the previous experiment 5.4.3 is
therefore a much better comparison of an algorithm’s performance.
Both variants of MCCR significantly outperform the random
opponent in all games. With the exception of PTTT, they are also at
least as good as the MCCFR “baseline”. This is because public states
in PTTT represent the number of moves made, which results in a
non-branching public tree and resolving games occupy the entire
level as in the original game. MCCR is better than OOS-PST in LD
and GP, and better than OOS-IST in large IIGS. MCCR is worse than
IS-MCTS on all games with the exception of small LD. However,
this does not necessarily mean that MCCR’s exploitability is higher
than for IS-MCTS in the larger domains, MCCR only fails to find
the strategy that would exploit IS-MCTS.
6 CONCLUSION
We propose a generalization of Continual Resolving from poker [22]
to other extensive-form games. We show that the structure of the
public tree may be more complex in general, and propose an ex-
tended version of the resolving gadget necessary to handle this
IIGS-5 MCCR (reset) MCCFR OOS-PST OOS-IST RM UCT RND
MCCR (keep) 0.4 ± 1.2 0.6 ± 1.3 – -2.6 ± 1.3 -2.8 ± 1.3 -6.5 ± 1.2 51.2 ± 1.2
MCCR (reset) -0.8 ± 1.2 – -2.5 ± 1.2 -5.5 ± 1.2 -8.1 ± 1.2 49.1 ± 1.2
MCCFR – -1.3 ± 1.3 -2.7 ± 1.3 -5.6 ± 1.2 48.5 ± 1.2
OOS-PST – – – –
OOS-IST -2.0 ± 1.3 -5.2 ± 1.2 54.5 ± 1.1
RM -16.6 ± 1.2 67.8 ± 1.0
UCT 70.0 ± 1.0
IIGS-13 MCCR (reset) MCCFR OOS-PST OOS-IST RM UCT RND
MCCR (keep) -18.8 ± 5.6 12.8 ± 5.7 – -7.3 ± 5.7 -56.4 ± 4.7 -69.1 ± 4.1 43.9 ± 5.1
MCCR (reset) 24.4 ± 5.5 – 4.9 ± 2.6 -35.6 ± 5.3 -56.0 ± 4.7 55.6 ± 4.7
MCCFR – -22.8 ± 5.6 -59.9 ± 4.6 -75.1 ± 3.7 37.8 ± 5.3
OOS-PST – – – –
OOS-IST -44.4 ± 5.1 -61.2 ± 4.5 58.2 ± 4.6
RM -22.8 ± 5.6 82.3 ± 3.2
UCT 91.2 ± 2.3
LD-116 MCCR (reset) MCCFR OOS-PST OOS-IST RM UCT RND
MCCR (keep) -1.4 ± 2.0 9.7 ± 2.0 5.2 ± 2.0 -4.1 ± 2.0 2.6 ± 1.0 5.6 ± 2.0 60.9 ± 1.6
MCCR (reset) 11.6 ± 2.0 10.1 ± 2.0 -3.9 ± 2.0 -5.5 ± 2.0 5.3 ± 2.0 60.5 ± 1.6
MCCFR -6.8 ± 2.0 -8.7 ± 2.0 -4.7 ± 2.0 1.9 ± 1.0 54.0 ± 1.7
OOS-PST -4.3 ± 2.0 -3.0 ± 2.0 6.5 ± 2.0 60.3 ± 1.6
OOS-IST -1.7 ± 1.0 5.2 ± 2.0 64.8 ± 1.6
RM 5.2 ± 2.0 66.1 ± 1.5
UCT 65.4 ± 1.5
LD-226 MCCR (reset) MCCFR OOS-PST OOS-IST RM UCT RND
MCCR (keep) 6.2 ± 5.4 45.3 ± 5.7 46.1 ± 5.7 -22.7 ± 5.9 -33.6 ± 5.7 -33.4 ± 5.7 76.2 ± 4.2
MCCR (reset) 37.8 ± 5.4 44.2 ± 5.7 -31.2 ± 5.7 -39.8 ± 5.4 -44.8 ± 5.2 81.6 ± 4.5
MCCFR -5.4 ± 4.6 -55.7 ± 4.5 -49.3 ± 4.6 -47.8 ± 5.1 45.8 ± 5.2
OOS-PST -53.6 ± 5.3 -51.5 ± 4.9 -46.4 ± 5.1 49.6 ± 4.1
OOS-IST -12.0 ± 5.6 -22.5 ± 5.6 83.8 ± 3.8
RM -11.6 ± 5.7 79.7 ± 3.5
UCT 75.4 ± 3.8
GP-3322 MCCR (reset) MCCFR OOS-PST OOS-IST RM UCT RND
MCCR (keep) 0.2 ± 0.4 2.2 ± 0.5 1.7 ± 0.5 0.4 ± 0.2 -0.5 ± 0.4 -1.5 ± 0.4 5.9 ± 0.5
MCCR (reset) 0.7 ± 0.4 0.4 ± 0.2 -0.3 ± 0.2 -0.5 ± 0.4 -1.0 ± 0.3 5.5 ± 0.4
MCCFR -1.9 ± 0.6 -2.7 ± 0.6 -3.6 ± 0.5 -3.3 ± 0.5 6.0 ± 0.6
OOS-PST -1.0 ± 0.9 -2.1 ± 0.5 -2.8 ± 0.4 7.4 ± 0.6
OOS-IST -1.3 ± 0.5 -2.1 ± 0.4 7.4 ± 0.6
RM -1.2 ± 0.4 7.8 ± 0.5
UCT 6.3 ± 0.4
GP-4644 MCCR (reset) MCCFR OOS-PST OOS-IST RM UCT RND
MCCR (keep) 1.6 ± 1.2 7.3 ± 2.6 14.2 ± 2.5 -3.4 ± 2.3 -4.1 ± 1.8 -6.9 ± 1.5 19.3 ± 2.6
MCCR (reset) 9.5 ± 2.0 11.9 ± 2.0 -3.5 ± 1.8 -3.0 ± 1.5 -2.5 ± 1.3 15.8 ± 2.2
MCCFR -8.7 ± 3.1 -13.3 ± 2.9 -9.6 ± 2.3 -6.8 ± 1.9 12.0 ± 3.0
OOS-PST -8.1 ± 3.0 -8.9 ± 2.4 -5.0 ± 2.0 11.8 ± 3.1
OOS-IST -2.1 ± 1.8 -1.6 ± 1.2 20.4 ± 2.9
RM -0.3 ± 1.1 20.5 ± 2.3
UCT 17.6 ± 2.0
PTTT MCCR (reset) MCCFR OOS-PST OOS-IST RM UCT RND
MCCR (keep) 17.7 ± 3.8 -1.1 ± 0.9 -1.8 ± 1.6 -5.0 ± 3.7 -6.9 ± 3.7 -6.2 ± 3.7 25.5 ± 3.8
MCCR (reset) -6.2 ± 3.8 -9.8 ± 3.7 -14.6 ± 3.6 -20.9 ± 3.6 -14.3 ± 3.7 21.6 ± 3.7
MCCFR 0.1 ± 3.7 -2.1 ± 1.5 -5.2 ± 3.7 -4.0 ± 3.6 27.9 ± 3.7
OOS-PST -5.6 ± 3.7 -5.7 ± 3.7 -5.2 ± 3.7 29.4 ± 3.7
OOS-IST -3.5 ± 3.2 -3.9 ± 3.6 35.1 ± 3.6
RM 5.6 ± 3.6 51.3 ± 3.3
UCT 52.6 ± 3.3
Table 1: Head-to-head performance. Positive numbers mean that the row algorithm is winning against the column algorithm
by the given percentage of themaximumpayoff in the domain. Gray numbers indicate thewinner isn’t statistically significant.
complexity. Furthermore, both players may play in the same pub-
lic state (possibly multiple times), and we extend the definition of
Continual Resolving to allow this case as well. We present a com-
pletely domain-independent version of the algorithm that can be
applied to any EFG, is sufficiently robust to use variable resolving
schemes, and can be coupled with different resolving games and
algorithms (including classical CFR, depth-limited search utilizing
neural networks, or other domain-specific heuristics). We show that
the existing theory naturally translates to this generalized case.
We further introduce Monte Carlo CR as a specific instance of
this abstract algorithm that uses MCCFR as a resolver. It allows
deploying continual resolving on any domain, without the need
for expensive construction of evaluation functions. MCCR is the-
oretically sound as demonstrated by Theorem 4.1, constitutes an
improvement over MCCFR in the online setting in terms head-
to-head performance, and doesn’t have the restrictive memory
requirements of OOS. The experimental evaluation shows that
MCCR is very sensitive to the quality of its counterfactual value
estimates. With good estimates, its worst-case performance (i.e.
exploitability) improves faster than that of OOS. In head-to-head
matches MCCR plays similarly to OOS, but it only outperforms
IS-MCTS in one of the smaller tested domains. Note however that
the lack of theoretical guarantees of IS-MCTS often translates into
severe exploitability in practice [20], and this cannot be alleviated
by increasing IS-MCTS’s computational resources [19]. In domains
where MCCR’s counterfactual value estimates are less precise, its
exploitability still converges to zero, but at a slower rate than OOS,
and its head-to-head performance is noticeably weaker than that
of both OOS and IS-MCTS.
In the future work, the quality of MCCR’s estimates might be
improved by variance reduction [26], exploring ways of improv-
ing these estimates over the course of the game, or by finding an
alternative source from which they can be obtained. We also plan
to test the hypothesis that there are classes of games where MCCR
performs much better than the competing algorithms (in particu-
lar, we suspect this might be true for small variants of turn-based
computer games such as Heroes of Might & Magic or Civilization).
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APPENDIX
ABBREVIATIONS
CFR CounterFactual Regret minimization
CFV CounterFactual Value v
EFG Extensive Form Game
IIG Imperfect-Information Game
IS-MCTS Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search
MCCFR Monte Carlo CounterFactual Regret minimization
MCCR Monte Carlo Continual Resolving
MCTS Monte Carlo Tree Search
NE Nash Equilibrium
OOS Online Outcome Sampling
OOS-IST OOS with Information Set Targeting
OOS-PST OOS with Public State Targeting
OS Outcome Sampling
RM Regret Matching
UCT Upper Confidence bound applied to Trees
A THE PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
We now formalize the guarantees available for different ingredients
of our continual resolving algorithm, and put them together to
prove Theorem 4.1.
A.1 Monte Carlo CFR
The basic tool in our algorithm is the outcome sampling (OS) variant
of MCCFR. In the following text, p ∈ (0, 1] and δ > 0 will be fixed,
and we shall assume that the OS’s sampling scheme is such that for
each z ∈ Z, the probability of sampling z is either 0 or higher than
δ .
In [17, Theorem 4], it is proven that the OS’s average regret de-
creases with increasing number of iterations. This translates to the
following exploitability bound, where ∆u,i := maxz1,z2 |ui (z1) −
ui (z2)| is the maximum difference between utilities and Ai :=
maxHi |A(h)| is the player i branching factor.
Lemma A.1 (MCCFR exploitability bound). Let σ¯T be the av-
erage strategy produced by applying T iterations of OS to some game
G. Then with probability at least 1 − p, we have
R¯Ti ≤
(√
2
p
+ 1
)
|Ii |∆u,i
√
Ai
δ
· 1√
T
. (7)
Proof. The exploitability expli (σ¯T ) of the average strategy σ¯T
is equal to the average regret R¯Ti . By Theorem 4 from [17], after T
iterations of OS we have
R¯Ti ≤
(√
2|Ii | |Bi |√
p
+Mi
)
∆u,i
√
Ai
δ
· 1√
T
with probability at least 1 − p, where Mi , |Bi | ≤ |Ii | are some
domain specific constants. The regret can then be bounded as
R¯Ti ≤
(√
2
p
+ 1
)
|Ii |∆u,i
√
Ai
δ
· 1√
T
,
which concludes the proof. □
Lemma A.2 (MCCFR value approximation bound). Let S ∈ S.
Under the assumptions of Lemma A.1, we further have∑
I ∈S (2)
v σ¯T2 (I ) −v σ¯T1 ,CBR(σ¯T1 )2 (I ) ≤(√
2
p
+ 1
)
|Ii |∆u,i
√
Ai
δ
· 1√
T
.
Proof. Consider the full counterfactual regret of player 2’s aver-
age strategy, defined in [29, Appendix A.1]:
RT2, full(I ) :=
1
T
max
σ ′2∈Σ2
T∑
t=1
(
v
σ t |D(I )←σ ′2
2 (I ) −vσ
t
2 (I )
)
, (8)
where D(I ) ⊂ I2 contains I and all its descendants. Since CBR2(σ¯T )
is one of the strategies σ ′2 which maximize the sum in (8), we have
RT2, full(I ) = v
σ¯T1 ,CBR(σ¯1)
2 (I ) −v σ¯
T
2 (I ). (9)
Consider now any S ∈ S. By [29, Lemma 6], we have∑
I ∈S (2)
v σ¯T2 (I ) −v σ¯T1 ,CBR(σ¯1)2 (I ) (9)≤ ∑
I ∈S (2)
RT2, full(I )
≤
∑
I ∈S (2)
∑
J ∈D(I )
RT ,+i, imm(J ) ≤
∑
J ∈I2
RT ,+i, imm(J ).
The proof is now complete, because the proof of [17, Theorem 4],
which we used to prove Lemma A.1, actually shows that the sum∑
J ∈I2 R
T ,+
i, imm(J ) is bounded by the right-hand side of (7). □
A.2 Gadget Game Properties
The following result is a part of why resolving gadget games are
useful, and the reason behindmultiplying all utilities inG
〈
S,σ ,vσ2
〉
by πσ−2(S).
Lemma A.3 (Gadget game preserves opponent’s values). Let
S ∈ S, σ ∈ Σ and let ρ˜ be any strategy in the resolving game
G ⟨S,σ , v˜⟩ (where v˜ is arbitrary). Denote σnew := σ |G(S )←ρ˜ . Then
for each I ∈ Iaug2 (G(S)), we have vσ
new
2 (I ) = v˜
ρ˜
2 (I ).
Note that the conclusion does not hold for counterfactual values of
the (resolving) player 1! (This is can be easily verified by hand in
any simple game such as matching pennies.)
Proof. In the setting of the lemma, it suffices to show that v˜ ρ˜2 (h)
is equal to vσ new2 (h) for every h ∈ G(S). Let h ∈ G(S) and denote by
д the prefix of h that belongs to Sˆ .
Recall that д˜ is the parent of д in the resolving game, and that the
reach probability π˜ µ˜−2(д˜) of д˜ in the resolving game (for any strategy
µ˜) is equal to πσ−2(д)/πσ−2(S). Since u˜2(z) = u2(z)πσ−2(S) for any
h ⊏ z ∈ Z, the definition of σnew, gives u˜ ρ˜2 (h) = uσ
new
2 (h)πσ−2(S).
The following series of identities then completes the proof:
v˜
ρ˜
2 (h) =
∑
h⊏z∈Z
π˜
ρ˜
−2(h)π˜ ρ˜ (z |h)u˜2(z)
= π˜
ρ˜
−2(h)u˜
ρ˜
2 (h)
= π˜
ρ˜
−2(д˜) · π˜−2(д |д˜) · π˜
ρ˜
−2(h |д) · u˜
ρ˜
2 (h)
= π˜
ρ˜
c (д˜) · 1 · π˜ ρ˜−2(h |д) · u˜
ρ˜
2 (h)
=
πσ−2(д)
πσ−2(S)
· 1 · π−2(h |д) · uσ new2 (h)πσ−2(S)
= πσ−2(h)uσ
new
2 (h) = πσ
new
−2 (h)uσ
new
2 (h) = vσ
new
2 (h).
□
Corollary A.4 (Gadget game preserves value approxima-
tion). Under the assumptions of Lemma A.3, we have the following
for each I ∈ Iaug2 (G(S)):vσ new2 (I ) −vσ new1 ,CBR(σ new1 )2 (I ) =v˜ ρ˜2 (I ) − v˜ ρ˜1, C˜BR(ρ˜1)2 (I ) .
Proof. By Lemma A.3, we have vσ new2 (I ) = v˜
ρ˜
2 (I ). We claim
that C˜BR(ρ˜1) coincides with CBR(σnew1 ) on G(S), which (again by
Lemma A.3) implies the equality of the corresponding counter-
factual values, and hence the conclusion of the corollary. To see
that the claim is true, recall that the counterfactual best-response
is constructed by the standard backwards-induction in the corre-
sponding game tree (player 2 always picks the action with highest
v
(·)
2 (I ,a)). We need this backwards induction to return the same
strategy independently of whether G(S) is viewed as a subgame of
G orG
〈
S,σ ,vσ2
〉
. But this is trivial, since both the structure ofG(S)
and counterfactual values of player 2 are the same in both games.
This concludes the proof. □
A.3 Resolving
The second useful property of resolving games is that if we start
with an approximately optimal strategy, and find an approximately
optimal strategy in the resolving game, then the new strategy will
again be approximately optimal. This is formalized by the following
immediate corollary of Lemma 24 and 25 from [22]:
Lemma A.5 (Resolved strategy performs well). Let S ∈ S,
σ ∈ Σ and denote by ρ˜ a strategy in the resolving game G˜
(
S,σ ,vσ2
)
.
Then the exploitability expl1(σnew) of the strategyσnew := σ |G(S )←ρ˜
is no greater than
expl1(σ ) +
∑
I ∈S (2)
vσ1,CBR(σ1)2 (I ) −vσ2 (I ) + e˜xpl1(ρ˜).
A.4 Monte Carlo Continual Resolving
Suppose that MCCR is run with parameters T0 and TR . For a game
requires at most N resolving steps, we then have the following
theoretical guarantee:
Theorem 4.1 (MCCR bound). With probability at least (1−p)N+1,
the exploitability of strategy σ computed by MCCR satisfies
expli (σ ) ≤
(√
2/√p + 1
)
|Ii |∆u,i
√
Ai
δ
(
2√
T0
+
2N − 1√
TR
)
,
where T0 and TR are the numbers of MCCR’s iterations in pre-play
and each resolving, N is the required number of resolvings, δ =
minz,t qt (z) where qt (z) is the probability of sampling z ∈ Z at
iteration t , ∆u,i = maxz,z′ |ui (z) −ui (z′)| andAi = maxI ∈Ii |A(I )|.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that MCCR acts
as player 1. We prove the theorem by induction. The initial step
of the proof is different from the induction steps, and goes as fol-
lows. Let S0 be the root of the game and denote by σ 0 the strategy
obtained by applying T0 iterations of MCCFR to G. Denote by ϵE0
the upper bound on expl1(σ 0) obtained from Lemma A.1. If S1
is the first encountered public state where player 1 acts then by
Lemma A.2
∑
I ∈S1(2))
vσ 02 (I ) −vσ 01 ,CBR(σ 01 )2 (I ) is bounded by some
ϵA0 . This concludes the initial step.
For the induction step, suppose that n ≥ 1 and player 1 has
already acted (n − 1)-times according to some strategy σn−1 with
expl1(σn−1) ≤ ϵEn−1, and is now in a public state Sn where he needs
to act again. Moreover, suppose that there is some ϵAn−1 ≥ 0 s.t.∑
Sn (2)
vσn−12 (I ) −vσn−11 ,CBR(σn−11 )2 (I ) ≤ ϵAn−1.
We then obtain some strategy ρ˜n by resolving the game G˜n :=
G
〈
Sn ,σ
n ,vσ
n
2
〉
by TR iterations of MCCFR. By Lemma A.1, the
exploitability e˜xpl1(ρ˜n ) in G˜n is bounded by some ϵRn .
We choose our next action according to the strategy
σn := σn−1 |G(Sn )←ρ˜n .
By Lemma A.5, the exploitability expl1(σn ) is bounded by ϵEn−1 +
ϵAn−1 + ϵ
R
n =: ϵEn . The game then progresses until it either ends
without player 1 acting again, or reaches a new public state Sn+1
where player 1 acts.
If such Sn+1 is reached, then by Lemma A.2, the value approxima-
tion error
∑
Sn+1(2)
v˜ ρ˜n2 (I ) − v˜ ρ˜n1 ,CBR(ρ˜n1 )2 (I ) in the resolving gadget
game is bounded by some ϵAn+1. By Lemma A.3, this sum is equal
to the value approximation error∑
Sn+1(2)
vσn2 (I ) −vσn1 ,CBR(σn1 )2 (I )
in the original game. This concludes the inductive step.
Eventually, the game reaches a terminal state after visiting some
sequence S1, . . . , Sn of public states where player 1 acted by using
the strategy σ := σN . We now calculate the exploitability of σ . It
follows from the induction that
expl1(σ ) ≤ ϵEN = ϵE0 + ϵA0 + ϵR1 + ϵA1 + ϵR2 + · · · + ϵAN−1 + ϵRN .
To emphasize which variables come from using T0 iterations of
MCCFR in the original game and which come from applying TR
iterations of MCCFR to the resolving game, we set ϵ˜Rn := ϵRn and
ϵ˜An := ϵAn for n ≥ 1. We can then write
expl1(σ ) ≤ ϵEN = ϵE0 + ϵA0 +
N−1∑
n=1
(ϵ˜Rn + ϵ˜An ) + ϵ˜RN . (10)
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Figure 4: An extension of experiment 5.4.1 and Figure 2 (left)
for small domains. We calculate the exact values u(h), and
compute the absolute differences of eachweighing sampling
scheme (u˜1(h) and u˜2(h)) to exact values. Those differences
are then averaged across information sets and seeds. In each
domain, the weighted averages (solid) have smaller error
than ordinary averages (dashed) and are thus better approx-
imations of exact values.
Since the bound from LemmaA.1 is strictly higher than the one from
Lemma A.2, we have ϵA0 ≤ ϵE0 and ϵ˜An ≤ ϵ˜Rn . Moreover, we have
G(S1) ⊃ G(S2) ⊃ . . .G(SN ), which means that ϵ˜R1 ≥ ϵ˜R2 ≥ . . . ϵ˜RN .
It follows that expl1(σ ) ≤ 2ϵE0 + (2N −1)ϵ˜R1 . Finally, we clearly have
N ≤ D1, where D1 is the “player 1 depth of the public tree of G”.
This implies that
expl1(σ ) ≤ 2ϵE0 + (2D1 − 1)ϵ˜R1 . (11)
Plugging in the specific numbers from Lemma A.1 for ϵE0 and ϵ˜
R
1
gives the exact bound, and noticing that we have used the lemma
(D1 + 1)-times implies that the result holds with probability (1 −
p)D1+1. □
Note that a tighter bound could be obtained if we were more
careful and plugged in the specific bounds from Lemma A.1 and
A.2 into (10), as opposed to using (11). Depending on the specific
domain, this would yield something smaller than the current bound,
but higher than ϵE0 + ϵ˜
R
1 .
B COMPUTING COUNTERFACTUAL VALUES
ONLINE
For the purposes of MCCR, we require that our solver (MCCFR)
also returns the counterfactual values of the average strategy. The
straightforward way of ensuring this is to simply calculate the coun-
terfactual values once the algorithm has finished running. However,
this might be computationally intractable in larger games, since it
potentially requires traversing the whole game tree. One straight-
forward way of fixing this issue is to replace this exact computation
by a sampling-based evaluation of σ¯T . With a sufficient number of
samples, the estimate will be reasonably close to the actual value.
In practice, this is most often solved as follows. During the nor-
mal run of MCCFR, we additionally compute the opponent’s sam-
pled counterfactual values
v˜σ
t
2 (I ) :=
1
πσ
′(z)π
σ t
−2 (h)πσ
t(z |h)u2(z).
Once the T iterations are complete, the counterfactual values of
σ¯T are estimated by v˜(I ) := 1T
∑
v˜σ
t
2 (I ). While this arithmetical
average is the standard way of estimating v σ¯T2 (I ), it is also natural
to consider alternatives where the uniform weights are replaced by
either πσ t (I ) or πσ t2 (I ). In principle, it is possible for all of these
weighting schemes to fail (see the counterexample in Section B.1).
We experimentally show that all of these possibilities produce good
estimates of v σ¯T2 in many practical scenarios, see Figure 4. Even
when this isn’t the case, one straightforward way to fix this issue
is to designate a part of the computation budget to a sampling-
based evaluation of σ¯T . Alternatively, in Lemma B.2 we present a
method inspired by lazy-weighted averaging from [17] that allows
for computing unbiased estimates of vσT2 on the fly during MCCFR.
In the main text, we have assumed that the exact counterfactual
values are calculated, and thus that v˜(I ) = v σ¯T2 (I ). Note that this
assumption is made to simplify the theoretical analysis – in practice,
the difference between the two terms can be incorporated into
Theorem 4.1 (by adding the corresponding term into Lemma A.5).
B.1 The Counterexample
In this section we show that no weighting scheme can be used as a
universal method for computing the counterfactual values of the
average strategy on the fly. We then derive an alternative formula
forv σ¯Ti and show that it can be used to calculate unbiased estimates
of v σ¯Ti in MCCFR. Note that this problem is not specific to MCCFR,
but also occurs in CFR (although it is not so pressing there, since
CFR’s iterations are already so costly that the computation of exact
counterfactual values of σ¯T is not a major expense). But since these
issues already arise in CFR, we will work in this simpler setting.
Suppose we have a history h ∈ H , strategies σ 1, . . . ,σT and the
average strategy σ¯T defined as
σ¯T (I ) :=
∑
t
πσ
t
i (I )σ t (I ) /σtπσ
t
i (I ) (12)
for I ∈ Ii . First, note that we can easily calculate π σ¯T−i (h). Since
v σ¯
T
i (h) = π σ¯
T
−i (h)uσ¯
T
i (h), an equivalent problem is that of calcu-
lating the expected utility of the average strategy at h on the fly,
i.e. by using uσ ti (h) and possibly some extra variables, but without
having to traverse the whole tree below h.
Looking at the definition of the average strategy, themost natural
candidates for an estimate of uσ¯Ti (h) are the following weighted
averages of uσ ti (h):
u˜1(h) :=
∑
t
uσ
t
i (h) /T
u˜2(h) :=
∑
t
πσ
t
i (h)uσ
t
i (h) /
∑
t
πσ
t
i (д)
u˜3(h) :=
∑
t
πσ
t(h)uσ ti (h) /
∑
t
πσ
t(д).
h0
0
h1
0
h2
0
h3
0
1
z
Figure 5: A domain where weighting schemes for v σ¯T2 fail.
Example B.1 (No weighting scheme works). Each of the estimates
u˜ j (h), j = 1, 2, 3, can fail to be equal to uσ¯Ti . Yet worse, no similar
works reliably for every sequence (σ t )t .
Consider the game from Figure 5 with T = 2, where under σ 1,
each player always goes right (R) and under σ 2 the probabilities
of going right are 12 ,
1
3 ,
1
5 and
1
7 at h0, h1, h2 and h3 respectively.
A straightforward application of (12) shows that the probabilities
of R under σ¯ 2 are 34 ,
2
3 ,
11
15 and
11
14 and hence u
σ¯ 2
1 (h2) = 1115 · 1114 =
121
210 . On the other hand, we have u˜
1(h2) = 108210 , u˜2(h2) = 142210 and
u˜3(h2)  181210 .
To prove the “yet worse” part, consider also the sequence of
strategies ν1, ν2, where ν1 = σ 1 and under ν2, the probabilities of
going right are 12 ,
1
3 , 1 and
1
5 · 17 ath0,h1,h2 andh3 respectively. The
probabilities of R under ν¯2 are 34 ,
2
3 , 1 and
27
35 and hence u
ν¯ 2
1 (h2) =
27
35 =
162
210 ,
121
210 = u
σ¯ 2
1 (h2). However, the strategies σ t and ν t
coincide between the root and h2 for each t , and so do the utilities
uσ
t (h0) anduν t (h0). Necessarily, any weighting scheme of the form
u˜(h) :=
∑
t
wt (h)uσ ti (h) /
∑
t
wt (h)
wherewt (h) ∈ R only depends on the strategy σ t between the root
and h, yields the same estimate for (σ t )t=1,2 and for (ν t )t=1,2. As a
consequence, any such weighting scheme will be wrong in at least
one of these cases.
B.2 An Alternative Formula for the Utility of
σ¯T
We proceed in three steps. First, we derive an alternative formula
for uσ¯T (h) that uses the cumulative reach probabilities
crpti (z) := πσ
1
i (z) + · · · + πσ
t
i (z)
for z ∈ Z. Then we remark that during MCCFR it suffices to keep
track of crpti (ha) where a ∈ A(h) and h is in the tree built by
MCCFR, and show how these values can be calculated similarly to
the lazy-weighted averaging of [17]. Lastly, we note that a sampled
variant can be used in order to get an unbiased estimate of uσ¯Ti .
Recall the standard fact that the average strategy satisfies
u
σ¯T1 ,ν2
i (h) =
∑
t π
σ t1
1 (h)u
σ t1 ,ν2
i (h)∑
t π
σ t1
1 (h)
(13)
for every h ∈ H , and has the analogous property for σ¯T2 . Indeed,
this follows from the formula
π σ¯
T
i (h) =
1
T
∑
t
πσ
t
i (h), (14)
which can be proven by induction over the length of h using (12).
Lemma B.2. For any h ∈ H , i and σ 1, . . . ,σT , we have uσ¯Ti (h) =∑
t
∑
z⊐h
(
πσ
t
1 (z)crpt2(z) + crpt1(z)πσ
t
2 (z) − πσ
t
1,2(z)
)
πc (z |h)ui (z)
crpT1 (h)crpT2 (h)
.
Proof. For h ∈ H , we can rewrite uσ¯Ti (h) as
uσ¯
T
i (h) = u
σ¯T1 , σ¯
T
2
i (h)
(13)
=
∑
t π
σ t1
1 (h)u
σ t1 , σ¯
T
2
i (h)
crpT1 (h)
(13)
=
∑
t π
σ t1
1 (h)
∑
s π
σ s2
2 (h)u
σ t1 ,σ
s
2
i (h)
crpT2 (h)
crpT1 (h)
=
∑
t
∑
s π
σ t1
1 (h) π
σ s2
2 (h) u
σ t1 ,σ
s
2
i (h)
crpT1 (h)crpT2 (h)
=
N
D
.
Using the definition of expected utility, we can rewrite the numera-
tor N as
N =
∑
s,t
π
σ t1
1 (h) π
σ s2
2 (h)
∑
z⊐h
πσ
t
1 (z |h) πσ
s
2 (z |h)πc (z |h)ui (z)
=
∑
s,t
∑
z⊐h
π
σ t1
1 (z) π
σ s2
2 (z) πc (z |h)ui (z)
=
∑
z⊐h
(
πc (z |h)ui (z)
∑
s,t
π
σ t1
1 (z) π
σ s2
2 (z)
)
.
The double sum over s and t can be rewritten using the formula∑
t
∑
s
xtys =
∑
t
[xt (y1 + · · · + yt ) + (x1 + · · · + xt )yt − xtyt ] ,
which yields
∑
s,t π
σ t
1 (z) πσ
s
2 (z) =
=
∑
t
[
πσ
t
1 (z)
(
πσ
1
2 (z) + · · · + πσ
t
2 (z)
)
+
+
(
πσ
1
1 (z) + · · · + πσ
t
1 (z)
)
πσ
t
2 (z) − πσ
t
1 (z)πσ
t
2 (z)
]
=
∑
t
[
πσ
t
1 (z) crpt2(z) + crpt1(z) πσ
t
2 (z) − πσ
t
1 (z)πσ
t
2 (z)
]
.
Substituting this into the formula for N and ND concludes the proof.
□
B.3 Computing Cumulative Reach
Probabilities
While it is intractable to store crpti (z) in memory for every z ∈ Z,
we can store the cumulative reach probabilities for nodes in the tree
Tt built by MCCFR at time t . We can translate these into crpti (z)
with the help of the uniformly random strategy rnd:
Lemma B.3. Let z ∈ Z be s.t. z ⊐ ha, where h is a leaf of Tt and
a ∈ A(h). Then we have crpti (z) = crpti (ha)π rndi (z |ha).
Proof. This immediately follows from the fact that for any д <
Tt , σ s (д) = rnd(д) for every s = 1, 2, . . . , t . □
To keep track of crpti (ha) for h ∈ Tt , we add to it a variable
crpi (h) and auxiliary variables wi (ha), a ∈ A(h), which measure
the increase in cumulative reach probability since the previous
visit of ha. All these variables are initially set to 0 except forwi (∅)
which is always assumed to be equal to 1. Whenever MCCFR visits
some h ∈ Tt , is visited, crpi (h) is increased bywi (h) (stored in h’s
parent), eachwi (ha) is increased bywi (h)πσ ti (ha |h) andwi (h) (in
the parent) is set to 0. This ensures that whenever a valuewi (ha)
gets updated without being reset, it contains the value crpti (ha) −
crpthai (ha), where tha is the previous time when ha got visited. As a
consequence, the variables crpi (ha) that do get updated are equal to
crpti (ha). Note that this method is very similar to the lazy-weighted
averaging of [17].
Finally, we observe that the formula from Lemma B.2 can be
used for on-the-fly calculation of an unbiased estimate of uσ¯Ti (h).
Indeed, it suffices to replace the sum over z by its sampled variant
sˆti (h) :=
1
qt (z)
(
πσ
t
1 (z)crpt2(z) + crpt1(z)πσ
t
2 (z) − πσ
t
1,2(z)
)
πc (z |h)ui (z), (15)
where z is the terminal state sampled at time t and qt (z) is the prob-
ability that it got sampled with z. We keep track of the cumulative
sum
∑
t sˆ
t
i (h) and, once we reach iterationT , we do one last update
of h and set
u˜i (h) :=
∑
t sˆ
t
i (h)
crpT1 (h)crpT2 (h)
and v˜i (h) := π σ¯T−i (h)u˜i (h).
By (15) and Lemma B.2, we have Eu˜i (h) = uσ¯Ti (h) and thus Ev˜i (h) =
v σ¯
T
i (h). Note that v˜i (h) might suffer from a very high variance and
devising its low-variance modification (or alternative) would be
desirable.
C GAME RULES
Biased Rock Paper Scissors B-RPS is a version of standard game
of Rock-Paper-Scissors with modified payoff matrix:
R P S
R 0 -1 100
P 1 0 -1
S -1 1 0
This variant gives the first player advantage and breaks the game
action symmetry.
Phantom Tic-Tac-Toe PTTT Phantom Tic-Tac-Toe is a partially
observable variant of Tic-Tac-Toe. It is played by two players on
3x3 board and in every turn one player tries to mark one cell. The
goal is the same as in perfect-information Tic-Tac-Toe, which is to
place three consecutive marks in a horizontal, vertical, or diagonal
row.
Player can see only his own marked cells, or the marked cells of
the opponent if they have been revealed to him by his attempts to
place the mark in an occupied cell.
If the player is successful in marking the selected cell, the oppo-
nent takes an action in the next round. Otherwise, the player has
to choose a cell again, until he makes a successful move.
The opponent receives no information about the player’s at-
tempts at moves.
Imperfect Information Goofspiel In II-GS(N), each player
is given a private hand of bid cards with values 0 toN−1. A different
deck of N point cards is placed face up in a stack. On their turn,
each player bids for the top point card by secretly choosing a single
card in their hand. The highest bidder gets the point card and adds
the point total to their score, discarding the points in the case of a
tie. This is repeated N times and the player with the highest score
wins.
In II-Goofspiel, the players only discover who won or lost a bid,
but not the bid cards played. Also, we assume the point-stack is
strictly increasing: 0, 1, . . .N − 1. This way the game does not have
chance nodes, all actions are private and information sets have
various sizes.
Liar’s Dice LD(D1,D2,F), also known as Dudo, Perudo, and
Bluff is a dice-bidding game. Each die has faces 1 to F − 1 and a star
⋆. Each player i rollsDi of these dice without showing them to their
opponent. Each round, players alternate by bidding on the outcome
of all dice in play until one player "calls liar”, i.e. claims that their
opponent’s latest bid does not hold. If the bid holds, the calling
player loses; otherwise, she wins. A bid consists of a quantity of
dice and a face value. A face of ⋆ is considered wild and counts as
matching any other face. To bid, the player must increase either
the quantity or face value of the current bid (or both).
All actions in this game are public. The only hidden information
is caused by chance at the beginning of the game. Therefore, the
size of all information sets is identical.
Generic Poker GP(T, C, R, B) is a simplified poker game
inspired by Leduc Hold’em. First, both players are required to put
one chip in the pot. Next, chance deals a single private card to each
player, and the betting round begins. A player can either fold (the
opponent wins the pot), check (let the opponent make the next
move), bet (add some amount of chips, as first in the round), call
(add the amount of chips equal to the last bet of the opponent into
the pot), or raise (match and increase the bet of the opponent).
If no further raise is made by any of the players, the betting
round ends, chance deals one public card on the table, and a second
betting round with the same rules begins. After the second betting
round ends, the outcome of the game is determined - a player wins
if: (1) her private card matches the table card and the opponent’s
card does not match, or (2) none of the players’ cards matches the
table card and her private card is higher than the private card of
the opponent. If no player wins, the game is a draw and the pot is
split.
Game |H |
IIGS(5) 41331
IIGS(13) ≈ 4 · 1019
LD(1,1,6) 147456
LD(2.2,6) ≈ 2 · 1010
GP(3,3,2,2) 23760
GP(4,6,4,4) ≈ 8 · 108
PTTT ≈ 1010
Table 2: Sizes of the evaluated games.
The parameters of the game are the number of types of the cards
T , the number of cards of each type C , the maximum length of
sequence of raises in a betting round R, and the number of different
sizes of bets B (i.e., amount of chips added to the pot) for bet/raise
actions.
This game is similar to Liar’s Dice in having only public actions.
However, it includes additional chance nodes later in the game,
which reveal part of the information not available before. Moreover,
it has integer results and not just win/draw/loss.
No Limit Leduc Hold’em poker with maximum pot size of N and
integer bets is GP(3, 2,N ,N ).
D EXTENDED RESULTS
II-GS(5) LD(1,1,6) GP(3,3,2,2)
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II-GS(13) LD(2,2,6) GP(4,6,4,4)
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Number of samples
−0.05
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0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
∆
v
(t
)
101 102 103 104 105 106 107
Number of samples
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)
Table 3: Comparison of counterfactual values for different domains by tracking how absolute differences ∆t (J ) = |v˜t2(J )−v˜T2 (J )|
change over time.
II-GS(5) LD(1,1,6) GP(3,3,2,2)
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II-GS(13) LD(2,2,6) GP(4,6,4,4)
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Number of samples
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−0.0010
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−0.008
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−0.002
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Table 4: Comparison of counterfactual values for different domains by tracking how relative differences ∆t (J ) = v˜t2(J ) − v˜T2 (J )
change over time.
II-GS(5) LD(1,1,6) GP(3,3,2,2)
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10−1
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² = 0.4
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² = 0.8
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100
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² = 0.2
² = 0.4
² = 0.6
² = 0.8
Table 5: Sensitivity to exploration parameter. Top row is "reset" variant, bottom row is "keep" variant.
